Identity of sense pronominalization, as is well known, operates with considerable freedom (subject only to the constraints on backwards pronominalization) and ignores sentence boundaries, islands, and other barriers to rules with variables:

(1) Jack favors the older gorilla. I like the younger one.
(2) My gorilla is cute, but Jack’s is really luscious.
(3) Jack admits that my gorilla is cute, but he claims that his is a lot neater.
(4) Jack admits that my gorilla is cute, but he won’t listen to the suggestion that we get mine and his together.

Sentences (2)–(4) demonstrate a typical effect of identity of sense pronominalization, that of leaving a genitive NP as the only trace of a pronominalized NP. The same rule can leave a genitive interrogative pronoun:

(5) My gorilla is over there drinking punch. Whose is that banging at the window?
(6) I don’t know whose you could have seen banging at the window.
(7) Jack doesn’t believe my claim that I don’t know whose he saw banging at the window.
(8) That I can’t have any idea whose you saw banging at the window should be obvious.

In short: not surprisingly, the rule of identity of sense pronominalization is insensitive to whether the genitive NP left behind is an interrogative pronoun or not. The rule is, however, inexplicably sensitive to whether the genitive NP left behind is a relative pronoun:

(9) My gorilla is over there drinking punch.
*The guy whose you saw banging at the window is over there watering the rubber tree.
(10) *Melvin, whose is banging at the window, is over there watering the rubber tree.

Our present theory of pronominalization cannot account for this difference. Will anybody whose can please step forward?

Amidst the confusion about what kind of linguistic phenomena can and cannot be justifiably referred to as “presuppositions”, there has always been one class of examples above suspicion, the presuppositions on so-called “factive predicates”. Recently, this paradigm case has been chal-